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•·  c- J  r 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
In  speaking  to  you  as  a  member  of  the  European  Parliament 
the  subject  closest  to  my  heart  is  trans-Atlantic  relations  and 
I  shall  there~ore be  dealing  with  relations  between  the  United 
Stat~s  and  the  European  Community.  Many  of  the  current  hot  issues 
in  this  respect  are  now  the  responsibility  of  the  Community  as 
such  and  no  more  of  individual  Member  States  like  France.  I  am 
thinking  especially  of  commercial  policy  and  agriculture. 
Before  discussing  with  you  the  different  pain~ of  friction 
between  the  EEC  and  the  United  States,  I  should  first  of  all  like 
t o  u n d e r 1 in  ~-' 
Parliament  on 
as  I  had  the  occasion  to  do  before  the  European 
October  13,  1982  in  Strasbourg,  the  importance  of 
our  common  heritage.  We  should  never  forget  that  our  peoples  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean  are  deeply  attached  to  the  same 
values,  values  like  liberty  and  democracy,  human  rights  and  freedom 
of  speech.  These  values  separate  us  clearly  from  certain other 
regimes  in  the  world.  They  are  values  which  are  deeply  rooted  in 
our  history,  values  that,  whatever  may  divide  us  for  the  moment, 
- .  ~ 
will  always  unite  us  in  the  end.  ~ 
As  everyone  knows  the  Community's  relations  with  the  United 
States  in  recent  months  have  been  bad·~~ at  least  by  reference  to 
earlier years  before  economic  recession  had  established  its present 
gr~p  on  the  world  economy.  I  intend  to  limit  myself  to  four  aspects 
only  of  our  relations  a~then to  draw  some  general  conclusions • 
. . I . .  2 
.. .. 
2. 
First~y,  corrrrnerce.  Although  some  important disputes 
have  now  been resolved,· this remains  an  area  subject to tensions, 
not  just because of the  increased protectionism ¥rhich  is to be 
~  .  . 
expected  durin-g  an  economic  recession,  but also because recent 
developments  have  revealed  important political differences of 
attitude  especially with  reg~rd to East-West  trade. 
The  European  Cornmunity.and  the  United  States  form 
together  wi  f·h  Japan  the  three main pillars of world  trade.  The 
US  is, by  fa,r  the.most  important trading partner of  the  European 
Community  taken  as  a  vJhole  and  the  EC  is by  much  the  largest 
export market of the  US  (although  Canada constitutes in most 
years  a  larger  source  of  US  exports).  For  investment  flows  also, 
the  US  and  the  EC  are  each other's main partners,  taking the 
lion's share  of  international  investment world-wide  .  ... 
'. 
Our  economies  are therefore condemned  to coexist. 
There are only  few  aims  of government policy more  important than 
I 
ensuring  the  smooth  running -of  our  commercial  relations.  In conduc-
ting  such  relations,  negoti"ation  on  the basis of equal partner-
'ship is the  only method  of  reducing  trAde  frictions to  a  minimum. 
~ 
An  ''aggressive''  style of conducting foreign  relations,  where 
Government  spokesmen  ~mphasise conflict rather  than  common  interest, 
is only too  likely to  increase frictions  and  handicap that  smooth 
running  of  our  commercial relations. 
. ./.  •  3 
.. -~-~-------------------------
3. 
The  path of negotiations for  the resolution of  trading 
prol:>lems ·;is.  to be  pl.irs~ed 'at the meeting  of  GATT  Ministers  to be 
held  in  Geneva.  next  week.  The  successful  outcome  of this meeting 
;t~  in.  d~ubt.  It...-has  not  in any  ca,se. been  h~lpe.d by  the recent 
grave:~ispuies concerriing  export credits,  steel  ex~oits  ~o y6ur 
country and  the.  stand your  gover:ri:rnent  has  taken  on  the project of 
.  . 
the  gi:is  pipeline linking the  Soviet  Union  to Western  Europe. 
The· first  two 6f  thes~ have  now  been  resolved,  although 
.;i:n  wa,ys  that.may have  bitter consecjuences.  The  OECD  consensus  on 
expol:'t  cred.it1  was  eventually renewed  in July 1982  on  terms  which 
will considerably raise the cost ·o;f  our exports to  some  developing 
countries  (and  to the Soviet UnionY.  To  illustrate this point,  I 
·11\9-.Y  mention  that minimum  .;interest rates for  our  export credits to 
1 'relatively rich' 1  countrie~,  now  including the  USSR  and  East  Germany, 
have  peen.  ;t.ncrea.~ed  by  1 .. 15%  and  for  mesium-i~come· countries  by  0.35%. 
'. 
The  steel dispute  has  been  ~esolved b~ an  ~greement, valid 
op;J.,y  't:mt.if l,985,  U,nder  which the  Community ·ag-reed  ''voluntarily''  to 
restri~t the volume  of ·it~  ~teel expo;r-ts  to  a  rather  small  share of 
the  US  m.arket~  You  will,  remember  that the criteria used  by  the  us 
'  .  . 
Pepa;:=-tment  o;f  Col1\f!1erce  to. estim  .. ate  the ~~gree of  subsidy  on  certain 
steel.  products  we;r::e  ~trong-ly contested by the Community's  authorities. 
Th.;i~  ag-reement  has  removed  one  o;f  the most  severe  trade 
;fr  }:ctions in the· cornm.ercial.  h.;i.sto;(-y  ot.  the relationship between  the 
Upi-ted  States  and  the  European  Community  and  has .shown  that difficult 
disputes  can  be  settled in an  atmosphere of cooperation,  understanding  .. 
___ /  ___  4 .. 
and  friendship  is prevaling.  As  a  side  show  of this agreement  we  have 
.  .  -
}:)een  happy  to experience  a  strengthening of  European  Unity  by  the 
association of  Germany,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  to this agree-
ment,  these countries  having  furnished  only  small  or no  subsidies to 
their steel industries  . 
....  . 
There  remains  the  ''pipeline''  dispute~  The  issues that lie 
behind  the disagreement  involved  here  are clearly more political than 
commercial.  The  decision of  the  US  Administration to apply  sanctions 
to European  subsidiaries of American  companies  and  to European  licenses 
·,; 
~ 
of  US  technology,  who 
the_gas  pipelinl:!  from 
export  equipment  for use  in the construction of 
.  l 
Siberia to Western  Europe,  has  raised very  impor-
tant questions of principle. 
In  the  opinion of  the  Community  this decision violates both 
the  international code  of conduct stipulating that existing contracts 
be  respected  of the  US  government affect companies  established accord-
ing  to the national legislation of  EC  member  states.  The  abrogation of 
this decision by  the  US  authoritie~ will  be  the~~, 'condition  sine  qua  non' 
.  ..  .  .  . 
that is,  the condition which  has  absolutly to be fulfilled before  a  com-
promise  can  be  reached  which  is acceptable-to the  Community . 
. ...._ 
It is simply not acceptable that the  US  seek  to  impose its 
views  in this way.  If we  want  to guarantee  a  .harmonious,  US-EC  relation-
.shi'p_ in  a  democratic  context, differing  Of?t.:Pion~ must  be  tolerated even if 
they concern  such vital issues as  the  suppression of the Polish  syndicate 
''Sol~darity''  or the  strategic importance  of East-West  trade. 
With regard  to the  economic  aspects  of  the pipeline dispute, 
we  are especially disappointed that the  US  government  takes  the  stand  tha 
its own  cereal  exports  to the  Soviet  Union  are permissible and  may  even 
.. 
. . I.  .  s 5. 
be  increased  whereas  exports  of  machinery  by  others  are  considered 
an  offense  against  political morale. 
We  do  not  accept  the  argument  that cereal  imports  deprive  the 
Soviet Union  of foreign  currency,  and  therefore  "damage"  the 
Soviet Economy,  while  imports  for  the pipeline  to Europe  provide 
them with  an  undesirable  advantage.  A  recent study by Wharton 
Econometrics  has  shown  that the  Soviet  Union  realises considerable 
savings  by  importing cereals rather than  growing  them at horne,  since 
conditions  are more  £avourable  £or agriculture  in your country. 
I 
The  discussion o£  the pi;·eline  issue  leads  me  quite 
naturally to my  second  subject  :  nergy.  The  situation in 
your  country,  the  United States,  's quite different  from  the 
European  situation,  as  you  have  enough  national resources 
to survive,  even when  imports  are  becoming  expensive  and difficult. 
,· 
We,  the  European  Community,  on  the  other hand,  have  a  great 
shortage  in energy,  whether it be  oil,  nuclear energy  or natural 
gas.  It seems  to me  that for  the  European  Community  it is a  matter 
o£  the highest  irnportance·to diversi£y external energy  sources, 
which  means  the  application of  an  energy policy which  does  not 
leave us  dependent upon  one  source  only,  whether it be  the  Soviet 
Union  or  any  other country.  The  United  States- and  the  European  .. 
Community  have  not initiated a  debate ~n th~ important issue. 
of  the repercussions  of  the changes ~hich ~ave ~aken place  over the 
last decade  in the  £ield of energy,  at least since  the last one 
took  place  five years  ago.  It is urgent  that we  organise  an  exchange 
o£  views  on  these matters.  ~  am  afraid that energy policy cannot 
be  resumed  to  the  simplistic request that Europeans  import  the1r 
oil or natural  gas  from  Norway  instead of from  the  Soviet Union. 
Importation  of  gas  is dependent  on  long  t~rrn strategic considerations. 
i- . 
You  cannot  just turn  on  a tap  and  let the  natural  gas  flow  through . 
• 
The  third issue  I  wish  to address  is one  one  which 
every Frenchrnan.being  a  farmer  in his  soul  feels  especially strong  . 
. . ·  .. I .·. .  6 
.. '  . 
I  naturally mean  agriculture.  This is an  exceedingly  complex 
subject,  let me  limit myself therefore to essentials at the 
risk of  seeming superficial. 
6. 
The  GATT  rules  which  govern  world  trade treat agriculture 
as  a  special case.· During  the  Tokyo  Round  of trade negotiations 
.  (  . 
the American  Government  agreed  to,'accept  the principles which 
govern  the  Community's  Common  Agr cultural Policy,  despite its 
known  opposition to certain aspe  s. 
This  opposition  has  bee
4 
strongly emphasised  by  the 
current Administration.  Many  cases  have  been brought before  the 
.  ·, 
GATT  by  the:US  Government  usually on  the  grounds  that the European 
Community  is competing  "un~airly" in its exports  to third countries. 
The  basis for  these  attacks  ~re the  subsidies provided  to agriculturaJ 
production  through  price  control  mechanism  and  to exports  through 
the  system of refunding  which  aligns the price of exports  to 
that prevailing on  world markets.  In addition the  US  had  announced 
its intention to seek  the  assimilation of  GATT  trade rules 
for  agriculture to those  for industrial products  .  ..  ~ 
The  Community's  response is well-known.  We  recognise 
that almost all count.ries,  including the  US  subsidise their 
. "' 
agriculture;  we  know  that  US  levels of  subsidy _per  farmer  are 
-
comparable  to those  in the  European  coffimunity.  We  are  convinced 
that our  Common  Agricultural Policy has  an  important  function 
in maintaining the  fabr~c of rural society  and  in  achieving 
agricultural autarky.  ~-
We  are  not willing to sacrifice this·protective  system 
under  any  circumstances.  No  doubt  there-will be  discussions  in 
Geneva  next  week  concerning  the  question of subsidies to agricul-
tural exports,  but we  shall strongly resist any  attempt  to curb 
the  expansion  of our  exports. 
. . .  I . . .  7 .. 
This  subject  provides  a  major  source  of dissension. 
It could  degenerate  into a  state of conflict,  given  the  strong 
interests of the  US  and  the  European  Community  in  promoting 
7 • 
their respective  agricultural exports.  However,  I  take  this 
opportunity to remind  you  that the  US  trade  surplus with  the 
European  Community  in  1981  amounted  to  some  $14  billion and  that 
a  large proportion  of  this surplus is represented  by  the  surplus 
of  trade  in a9!.icultural products. ·The  Europe~n Community  remains 
'  the  ~argest world  importer of food.and  the best customer of the 
United States.  It is true  that  in.~ecent years  there has  been 
a  slight increase in  the  EC  of world  agricultural exports 
and  a  very  small  decline  in  share.  But it would  be  utterly 
wrong  to conclude  that the proble  s  of the  US  agriculture  can  be 
solved  by  bullying Europe  to curb its exports. 
The  final  issue with·which  I  intend to deal- even 
more  briefly -·  i~  mon~tary policy,  or  mor~ speci£ically the 
international  consequences  of  US  interest rates.  As  we  are all 
aware,  interest rates  in  the  US,  and  throughout  the world,  have 
declined precipitously in .the  last month.  N~vertheless one  of 
the  consequences  of the  domestic  monet~ry p·olicy  followed  in the 
United States has  been  to ·maintain artificially high interest 
rates  throughout  the world  over  a  long period with  a  resulting 
reduction  in levels of  investment  and  of  ec?nomic  activity. 
A  second  consequence  has been  a  flow  of  international funds  into 
the  US  and·therefore.an artificially high value  of  the·us dollar, 
in which  a  large proportion of. goods  traded worldwide  continues 
to be  denominated.  The  high  level  of  ~erest rates,  combined 
with the  high  value of.the dollar,  have  had  a  crippling effect 
on  economics  thro~ghout the world  and  especially on  those  burdened 
by  debts  and  on  those  obligated  to  import  a  large proportion of 
their energy  needs. 
. ..  I ...  8 8. 
Given  these  ~dverse consequences  of its domestic  and 
economic  policies, it seems  to many  observers  outside  the  United 
States that in the definition  and  execution of these policies 
· more  weight  should  be  ascribed  to consideration regarding 
the  outside world.  Many  of  us  dou~t whether  consequences  of  us 
domestic policies are at all taken into account.  However, 
you will certainly agree  that.thejus  is too  important  a  part of the. 
world  economy  for  such  a  dangerou  neglect. 
What  then  are  my  conclusions  ?  In  the  global village 
"good  ne~gh~burliness" between  t!e  United  States  and  the  European 
I 
Community  is especially important if tensions  are  to be  reduced 
; 
and  economi;<-wounds  are  to heal.  ' 
This  means  that we  must  all be  ready  to learn  from 
recent experiences.  The  steel  an~ pipeline conflicts in particular 
show  the  importance  of negotiation  leading necessarily to 
concessions  by  each  side ..  They also reveal  the  need  for  a  consensus 
over  such diverse  issues as the nature  of  "a~ceptable" subsidies 
'  ~  to industry and  the  significance of  Ea~t-West trade.  The  Member 
States of the European  Community  wi~l not  allow themselves  to 
be  bludgeoned  into acceptance  of  the  apparent  US  view that all 
economic  contacts with.the Soviet  Union  are  suspect or  that all 
government  subsidies  are  wrong  even if they are  intended to 
assist reductions  in  capacity. 
Similarly;  with  regard to  ag~culture, the  US  must  be 
prepared to compromise; ·it cannot  seek. to  ch_ange  the  international 
rules  for  trade  in agriculture without  the  consent of its principal 
trading partner. 
. . . I . . .  9 Lastly,  if we  are to be  "good  neighbours",  we  must all 
.  . 
think more  about  the  impact  on  our  friends  of  the  policies which 
we  pursue at home.  This  of course.applies  just as  much  to the 
European  Community  and its individual Membe·r  States,  but  the 
very great  importance  of  the  United States  in world affairs 
.  j 
means  that the external  consequences  of American  domestic 
policies  a~e more  important  than  ~hose of policies conducted 
by  individual states in.Europe.  S  if-restraint and  consideration 
for  others  are  gualitie~ esseriti  to any  civilised person  and 
to any nation-state.  They  are  es ecially important in  economic 
relations between  the major  trad ng  powers  of  the world. 
As  I  said in the  beginning  of  my  speech,  we  are  linked 
9 . 
4 
~ 
by  common  v~~ues.  Our  civilisation is based  on  the  same  principles 
o£  democracy  and  freedom  o£ speech,  on  the  same  respect for 
the  individual  and  for  human  rights.  I  am  sure that these values, 
which  are  deeply  anchored  in our history  and  made  us  what  we  are 
tod~y, will._always  be  so  strong and vivid amongst  us  that  in 
the  end  they  w~ll enable  us to overcome  temporary difficulties 
such  as  the  ones  we  are  faced  with at the  present  time. 
*  *  * 